Russia and the Caucasus/Caspian Region

Where there are fossil fuels that more than one country can claim rights to the geopolitics of the region becomes extremely complex.  Add in a terrorist element and the stakes become even higher. The Caspian Basin has a number of countries which are taking advantage of the rich oil and natural gas reserves, including Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. In addition players such as Georgia, Armenia and Turkey get into the mix as countries where the fuel can efficiently transit to make it out to the open ocean for distribution around the world. Russia is clearly the big power player on the block and has been very keen on exercising its influence in the region to affect “pipeline politics”. That said though Russia has been dealing with its own political troubles in the region with the terror and separatist movements in the Caucasus Mountain regions of Chechnya, North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Karbardino-Balkaria and Dagastan. How Russia handles both its oil wealth, its internal security and its relations with it's neighbors is key to not only their own security policies but also those of the US and Europe.

Terrorism has been a feature in the northern Caucasus region for some time now and has resulted in harsh military crackdowns by the Russians in the Chechnya region on several occasions. This issue is far from being resolved. “Russia faces what one of President Putin’s senior political advisers calls an ‘‘underground fire’’ in the North Caucasus—made worse by the unending war in Chechnya—and its vulnerability to major terrorist incidents in that region and across Russia remains high” (Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force 2006, 31). The region has a large Muslim population leading many to believe that the terrorism is a result of growing Islamic extremism. However surveys of the young men (often the target of extremist recruiting) show that there is very little to support that notion. In an extensive study by Gerber and Mendleson (2009) it was clear that most men between the ages of 16 and 49 were not moved by the extreme Islamist notions. They are, however, very concerned about the extreme poverty, lack of jobs and corruption within their local governments. Should Islamic militant organizations act first on addressing the social needs of these regions, much like the Islamic Brotherhood does in Egypt (Marsot 2007), the sympathies for such movements can shift. This area is key for Russian energy transit to market and so terrorist activity in the area must be addressed as well as the social and economic depravity of the area. Russia has the opportunity here to take a positive approach to strong influence and long term stability it she addresses the root causes of the trouble here instead of the hard handed military approach while there is still time and the central government is still looked upon in a favorable light.

Russia hasn’t only been using a heavy hand within its own territory but also as a means to affect energy policies of its neighbors. “Russia is now using energy transfers “as a weapon” in its efforts to impose new pricing structures in Ukraine and Belarus, with deleterious impact upon contracted supply to the EU market…” (R. Craig Nation 2007, 9). These policies have understandably made the West nervous and as such as increased their determination to bypass Russia for delivery of the oil from the Caspian region. Two pipelines have been built using Georgia as a transit zone to the Black Sea. Russia has long been very nervous about Georgia’s western leanings and in 2008 "Sergei Lavrov, the Russian foreign minister, accused Washington of ‘infiltrating the post-Soviet space ever more actively: Ukraine and Georgia are graphic examples’…” (German 2009). Russia launched an invasion of Georgia in August of 2008 in an effort to undermine investor confidence in the stability of the region. If nothing else it did succeed to slow down investment and building in the region by showing how easily the Russian Army was able to get to the crucial pipelines (German 2009).

Russia and the West are involved in a new miniature “cold war” over energy security in the Caucasus and Caspian regions. Both are vying to influence post Soviet nations and have a strong say over their policies. The Russian government also has personal reasons for this as well. “To become a high official of the Kremlin is to become a part owner of some of the world’s largest corporations; to lose one’s official post means a potentially gigantic loss of personal wealth, or worse” (Council on Foreign Relations Independent Task Force 2006, 19). With state ownership of the energy companies, Russia has the very combustible combination of military power along with personal wealth considerations which make it a very unpredictable and volatile force in the region. Europe's heavy need for the energy produced in this region any adverse actions by Russia are seen as critical security issues for the US and NATO.

 

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Gerber, Theodore P., and Sarah E. Mendelson. "Security through Sociology: The North Caucasus and the Global Counterinsurgency Paradigm." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 (2009): 831-851.

German, Tracey C. "Pipeline Politics: Georgia and Energy Security." Small Wars and Insurgencies 20, no. 2 (2009): 344 - 362.

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Marsot, Afaf Luti Al-Sayyid. A History of Egypt: From the Arab Conquest to the Present. Second. Cambridge UK: Cambridge University Press, 2007.

R. Craig Nation, Dmitri Trenin. Russian Security Strategy Under Putin: U.S. And Russian Perspectives. Conference Presentations, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Inistitute, 2007.

Future of US Defense Strategy

I am sorry it has been so long.  Life got away from me last month between school, work and holidays.  The next few months will also be busy so I am expecting only once a month posting for now.  Hopefully after I am through the next three months of heavy class load I will be able to pick up the pace again.  Thanks for your patience.

The United States became the sole global power in many respects after the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991.  This includes the economic, political and military spheres.  No other country in the world had the resources to immediately compete or provide a balancing force to the US in any of these realms.  What makes this situation vastly different from previous global powers, such as the Romans or Ottoman empires, is the incredible near instant global reach that the US has to project all three of these spheres of power to any part of the world.  Thanks to the communication technology boom of the last 30 years though people, both governmental and non-governmental, can look at the US and how it is using its power with as much ease.  This fundamentally changes the defense picture for the United States.  While the US is unmatched in a head to head match between traditional military forces anywhere in the world, non-traditional enemies have surfaced requiring the US to rethink how it approaches defense in the twenty first century.  This thinking will need to embrace not only the military aspects of defense but recognize that defense of this country includes economic, environmental and political components as well.

Military threats of the twenty first century include new threats that change how the military must think about enemies and tactical methods of warfare. Traditionally defense policies have been built almost completely around military power and the ability to either project that power outward to respond to threats, or build defenses to prevent other powers from attacking the home front.  In the 1990’s most military planning focused around these efforts.   In Christopher Lambs review of how the US is attempting to transform its defense strategy he points out that in the 1990’s most of the Pentagon planning was built around two traditional threats, North Korea and Iraq (Lamb 2005).  Both of these scenarios revolve around traditional armies facing each other on the battlefield. “The greatest problem traditional militaries face today is that they are organized to wage big wars and have difficulty orienting themselves to fight small ones” (Arquilla 2010, 63). Non-traditional threats appeared to either be off the radar for the pentagon or just not given precedence in defense strategy planning.  In the early nineties the US had a brief taste of non-traditional warfare when they were engaged in Somalia and armed street gangs that blended into the public were causing all kinds of havoc for both the US Army and UN coalition troops.  The US did not understand how to fight this type of war and simply withdrew when the political will to fight collapsed after the Blackhawk incident.  It took the September 11 attacks to really bring home that the US could be attacked on its own soil from non-traditional actors who could inflict significant damage.  Even then though, the US felt it could deal with the organizations in a traditional way.  It was not until the military had been bogged down in Iraq and Afghanistan for five years that the establishment realized that major changes were necessary to defeat this new type of enemy.  Transforming the military has taken on new meaning with the lessons that have been learned from Iraq and Afghanistan.

Combating terrorism and non-state actors is not entirely a military affair.  One of the key components to disabling terror organizations is removing the availability of resources and locations to arm, train and rest.  Initially it was thought that government support of the group was necessary for them to establish safe havens, but this isn’t necessarily true anymore.  All they need are small locations that normally are not targeted (ie a mosque or school), which any attack against will result in serious PR and public opinion fallout (Innes 2009).  Yemen is a good example of a country that is trying to combat Al Quaeda infrastructure.  The US cannot send troops to every location in the world that potential terror groups are arming, in most cases without the support of the local government.  This is where the US needs to lead in building relationships with states where these groups find enough local support to thrive and coordinate.  The US can provide valuable advice and training to help each countries domestic resources combat these groups such that they will no longer be able to be a threat to the US and its allies.In addition the US must continue to build, and in some cases repair, its relationships with traditional allies, such as those in Europe, Middle East and the far east.  Non-state actors remain a threat to all nations in the world so building relationships can help to confine the mobility, arming, and funding capability of these organizations.

Building strong alliances is also key to dealing with other non-traditional threats to US security.  “Going forward, the purpose of alliances in U.S. national security policy must be fourfold: To generate capabilities that amplify American power; to create a basis of legitimacy for the exercise of American power; to avert impulses to counterbalance American power; and to steer partners away from strategic apathy or excessive self-reliance” (Sherwood-Randall 2006, v).  One example of a non-traditional threat that applies to why the second and third policy goals quoted above are important is the current Wikileaks phenomena.  In this case a single person, through the use of his company has exposed both US defense documentation and confidential foreign policy cables in an attempt to “expose” the US as a coercive force to the world.  When the US began to act more unilaterally under the Bush administration many of these alliances were undermined and traditional supporters of the US found it impossible to go along with US policy. “She [Condoleeza Rice] expressed the strongest disdain for those who believe that the legitimate exercise of American power derives from the support of other states or international institutions, concluding that the foreign policy of a Republican administration would “proceed from the firm ground of the national interest, not from the interests of an illusory international community” (Sherwood-Randall 2006, 6).  View was consistent with the foreign policy decisions made by the Bush administration through the first term of his presidency.  Unfortunately, this process served to undermine the legitimacy with which the US operates.  This adds fuel to the fire of people like Julian Assange, founder of Wikileaks, to undermine the US and put American citizens at risk.  Strong alliances help us fight such asymmetrical threats both by minimizing the impact of such disclosures and by providing public support for US policies throughout the world. 

The notion of national defense also needs to be expanded to include both economic and social aspects as well.  American companies have a global presence today and protecting their ability to function in a global economy means that the American people have jobs and opportunity.  This helps us to address home grown terror threats as well as helping to provide continued domestic legitimacy for our government.  There are also threats to American well being through climate change and disease pandemics to name a few.  Each of these require coordination with the international community.  The US has the resources and the standing to provide strong leadership in this area and, in the end, serve our national interests through becoming a strong leader in the global community.  “The largest states, when they help to provide these shared public goods, act as leaders by helping groups of nations to create and achieve shared goals – the very definition of leadership” (Nye 2008).  Through working on these shared goals the US will also continue to build legitimacy for the power we wield.  This has the additional benefit of deterring other nations from challenging the US national interests through more coercive means.  China is both a rising military and economic power and has shown signs of wanting to establish itself as the global leader through some minor saber rattling and economic policy.  Like the US though they too are dependent on the rest of the world to support their methods in order to gain that power.  Strong ties with the global community can help keep that in check while also allowing China to continue to grow economically and be a key player in the world order, thus ensuring stability for all.

The above only addresses a segment of the threats that the US must concern itself in the coming decades.  That said it is clear that the US needs to take a more holistic and global approach to addressing its defense needs in the coming decades.  There will need to be a lot of cross coordination and a change of culture that will need to be addressed.  Government agencies are generally very resistant to fundamental changes such as what is required here.  There will be significant challenges to addressing how information is shared, how joint coordination among military branches as well as civilian services are handled and how cross national coordination is completed.  Traditional stove pipe organizations are no longer suited for the type of cross functional threats that face the US today.  While challenging these issues are not impossible to overcome.  Transparency of decision making processes and education as to the reasons why these changes are necessary help to smooth such transitions.  A recognition that it will take time and strong leadership not just at the presidential level, but also at all levels of interaction is important as well.  The US has the potential to be the defining force in the world for the foreseeable future if it approaches its role in the world with humility and respect for all the people it interacts with.

Arquilla, John. "The New Rules of War." Foreign Policy, March/April 2010: 60-67.

Innes, Michael. "The Safe Haven Myth." Foreign Policy Online. October 12, 2009. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/12/the_safe_haven_myth?page=0,0 (accessed December 10, 2010).

Lamb, Christopher J. Transformation Defense. Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 2005.

Nye, Joseph S. "Recovering American Leadership." Survival 50, no. 1 (Februrary - March 2008): 55-68.

Sherwood-Randall, Elizabeth. Alliances and American National Security. Mongraph, Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute: US Army War College, 2006.